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SOME IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT LEGISLATION*
RoscoE PouNDS*

Forty years ago a speaker on such an occasion, when he was
called on to speak of American institutions, at once struck a note of
resounding eulogy. As the last step in a long course of evolution of
free institutions, ours were the best that man had known. We could
look upon them with just pride as the culmination of enlightened
progress of a free people. Thirty years ago the note had changed.
A speaker on such an occasion felt bound to aggressive criticism of
some details, while glorifying the principles of our institutions. He
felt bound to single out certain of the details for vigorous attack
and then to follow with an exposition of some single specific remedy,
to be put in force at once at the next session of the legislature-very
likely with the detailed draft of the necessary bill added in an
appendix. This bill was guaranteed to set everything right by its
intrinsic force and wisdom. Twenty years ago the note had changed
once more. The speaker who conformed to the fashion of that time
felt bound to utter a high and solemn note of warning. Our institutions were not only sound in principle, as we had always believed
them to be, their details, in which those principles were realized, were
precious possessions committed to our care to be zealously preserved
from every form of question, from every project which threatened
alteration or abrogation. They were beset with dangers. Heretical
teachers, newcomers imbued with wrong ideas derived from the
institutions of other lands, and agitators at home were undermining
them. Alien ideas were being propagated. Un-American ideas were
being taught and writings were in circulation from which they were
acquiring a wide currency. If these doctrines, subversive of Ameri* Address before The Investment Bankers Association of America, White
Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, October 29, 1938.
** Former Dean of the Harvard Law School.
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can ideals, American political principles and American institutions
were suffered to be disseminated, if they were not thoroughly
stamped out, the destruction of our institutions would carry down
with them all civilization in a general wreck.
Today something of all this may still be heard at times according to the occasion. But we have for the most part ceased to be
alarmed about our institutions or to care what may happen to them.
The dominant fashionable note just now is one of change. Everything has changed. All that we had learned in five generations of
political and economic and legal experience has become obsolete.
The inventive skill, the resourcefulness in business device on which
we had prided ourselves, has ceased to be significant. If we are still
to adhere to democracy, we must preserve democracy by building
all our institutions anew. The very nature of our people, if not
indeed of all mankind, has changed. What had been deemed virtues
are but discarded Victorian inhibitions. What had been thought
individual 'ights are but outmoded claims which can no longer be
admitted. What had been regarded as constitutional guarantees
are at most pious exhortations. They had often been misused by
reactionary judges who took seriously what were mere verbal formulas, not to be accorded a fictitious weight because they happened
to be announced in the text of the Constitution or to have been supposedly settled by a long course of judicial decision. Mere words,
wherever they may be found, are not to be allowed to stand in the
way of administrative leadership toward new goals.
Perhaps this fashion may in time prove to have been as transient as were its forerunners. But I am not here to urge return to
any of those fashions of the past. Nor am I here to spread the
gospel of some new fashion. I am not here to urge a return to the
economic ideas of the last century nor to call for repeal of the laws
which have been put upon our statute books in the past forty years.
I am not presenting some ambitious plan to remedy all the abuses
of our political and economic life by a great act of legislation to be
introduced in the appropriate legislative body tomorrow. I am not
here obeying a call to prophesy or to warn. But much less am I
inclined to admit that in the present decade in the twinkling of an
eye we were all changed; that there was overnight a complete breach
of historical continuity; that all need of constitutional guarantees
and checks and balances suddenly ceased and an era of enlightened
administrative omnicompetence supervened out of a clear sky.
What I shall essay is a more humble role of diagnostician. I shall
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ask what are the implications, or perhaps better, what are the presuppositions, of recent legislation, state and federal, which reflects
in action the fashionable mode of thought of the moment as to
economic, political and legal institutions.
Certain ideas had been developed in our polity through experience developed by reason and reason tested by experience. One
of the chief of these ideas was the idea of balance. No doubt this is
a hard idea to keep in mind in an age of rush and hurry and manifold distractions. Any one other than a skilled juggler finds it
difficult to keep two balls in the air continuously at the same time.
On the same principle it is difficult to keep in mind more than one
idea at a time. Yet to understand our government one must do this.
Indeed, this idea of balance is inseparable from a well ordered
society. At least in the English-speaking world we must have a
balance between stability and change, between the general security
and the individual life, between society and the individual, between
regimented co-operation and free individual initiative and activity,
between nation and state, between state and neighborhood, between
legislative and executive and judiciary. It was the need of such
balances, in the bad political and economic conditions following the
Revolution, which compelled the drawing up and adoption of the
Constitution. It is the achievement of these balances which has
made it possible to govern a whole continent by one political organization for a century and a half, marked by expansion in area and
in population beyond what the framers could have conceived, by
internal conflict and civil war, and by profound changes both in the
make-up of the population and in social and economic conditions.
It is a mistake to think of balance as an obsolete idea of the
eighteenth century. It is a mistake to think it something belonging
only to a past era of small, simple things. The bigger, the more
complex a society, the more and more complex the relations of
groups and associations calling for a weighing and valuing of their
claims, the more complicated becomes the task of adjusting their
conflicting and overlapping interests and clashing activities. Hence
men are driven to an omnicompetent state, to a superman leader,
to an administrative absolutism unless they can maintain a system
of balance. Otherwise there is an anarchy of struggling interests
in which the offhand adjustments for the time being take the form
of giving in to the more ruthless or more insistent or more unreasonable.
It is no more possible to cure all the ills which are incident to

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1939

3

208

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [1939], Art. 2
IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT LEGISLATION

the conduct of business in a big country, in an age of big things,
in a complex social and economic order, by a regime of complete
administrative regulation than by one of complete legislation,
covering all the details of conduct with detailed rules, or by one
of complete absence of regulation and unrestrained private individual initiative.
Another idea which had held a chief place in the polity of
English-speaking peoples was that one will was not to be subjected
arbitrarily to the will of another. More specifically the idea was
that no one was to be subject to arbitrary action of those who
wielded the power of politically organized society. As the great
preacher of the Pilgrims put it, we were to be with one another,
not over one another. This was the idea behind our bills of rights
and behind the doctrine our legal historians have been calling "the
supremacy of the law"; a doctrine once thought to be the birthright of the American but now sneered at frequently by young
lawyers newly appointed to give counsel to administrative bureaus
and imbued with the idea of the supremacy of the bureau.
Still another idea which had governed our polity was distribution rather than centralization of the powers of government.
This was an application of the idea of balance. It was an idea of
parceling out of authority among coordinate agencies of government, defining the limits of the power conferred upon each distributee, and keeping each within those limits by rules of law
judicially declared and administered. In the last century we thought
of this distribution of powers as something involved in the very
idea of freedom. Today it is scouted as something belonging to the
slow going days of the past and is disappearing before a tendency
to give bureaus and boards and commissions all the powers of
government without limitation or reservation.
All of these ideas run back to a fundamental idea of freedom
or liberty, an idea which has not merely ceased to be entertained
in advanced and self-styled liberal circles but has become distinctly unfashionable if not wholly repudiated. Cicero said we were
slaves of the law in order that we might be free. Today we are
to be the slaves of administrative officials in order that we may
preserve democracy by committing demos to the rule of unchecked
or merely self-checked discretion. The giving up of what had been
the basic ideas of our polity and of the fundamental idea on which
they rested, if indeed we mean consciously and seriously to give
them up, is so radical a departure as to justify the new faith in
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the gospel of change. The shifting from an idea of a free people
to one of a people divided into two classes, one of tribute payers
and one of pensioners of a regime of bureaus controlled ultimately
and absolutely by one exalted ruler, quite justifies those who hold
that a new era is at hand and that the break with our past is complete and irrevocable.
Undoubtedly, in common with the rest of the world, we in the
United States carried the idea of liberty and its corollaries much
too far in the latter part of the last century and in the immediate
past. The conception of leaving every one free to do as he liked
with no more restraint than was essential to enable other men to
do as they liked, so far as these two could be reconciled by a universal law, was excellently adapted to the pioneer conditions of our
formative era. Carried to an extreme, as the one thing to be regarded in an urban industrial society it obviously left interests of
the first moment unprovided for or inadequately provided for. So,
too, we carried too far the idea of checks upon the exercise of
governmental authority and overworked the machinery of judicial
review of governmental action with reference to constitutional
limitations. When I came to the bar in 1890 almost every item
of executive or administrative action as a matter of course encountered an injunction. But a reaction had begun a decade before. About 1880 there are signs of a shifting of the judicial view
as to what is exclusively judicial, and at the end of that decade the
setting up of the Interstate Commerce Commission marks the beginning of a rise of administrative justice which has gone on by
leaps and bounds in the twentieth century, and especially in the
current decade. This reaction was inevitable. But Spencer tells
us that action and reaction are equal and in opposite directions;
and that general philosophical proposition has been demonstrated
abundantly in the present connection. As we were going much too
far in one direction fifty years ago, we feel bound to go too far to
the same extent in the opposite direction today.
From the idea that all things will inevitably work themselves
out by experience and that planning and creative lawmaking are
futile, an idea generally received in the latter part of the nineteenth century, we have been going to the other extreme of an
idea that nothing will work out by experience but that all things
must of necessity be planned by legal or political or economic or
social super-experts and cannot with safety be left to any but a
governmental process of trial and error. From an idea of the in-
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dividual as a self-sufficient economic unit, we have been swinging
to the opposite extreme of an idea of the complete interdependence
of individuals, to be promoted by dependence upon the national
government. The old doctrine of the king as father of his country,
has been newly interpreted. The government is thought of as
an anxious mother directing the nurse to go upstairs and see what
Tommy is doing and tell him not to do it. From an extreme of
jealousy of administration and hampering of it by judicial scrutiny
and tying up of every important administrative act by injunction,
we have been going to a no less extreme confidence in administrative
agencies. Almost every activity has been put under the control
of some one of them, and that control tends constantly to increase,
to be relieved of legal limitations, and to be freed from effective
judicial review. Along with this there has sprung up a growing
belief in administration as something above and beyond law, as
something good in itself to be cultivated for its own sake; a type
of doctrine which I have been calling administrative absolutism.
Behind this doctrine of administrative absolutism is Karl
Marx's doctrine of the disappearance of law. As Marx saw it, law
will disappear with the abolition of private property. The legal
ordering of society results from the division of society into classes,
that is, into those who exploit and those who are exploited. It is
no more than a device of those who exploit to keep those whom they
exploit in subjection.' Hence when classes disappear in a communist organization of society, law, too, will come to an end.
"Communism" says a Russian exponent of this doctrine... ""means
the triumph of socialism over law, for law will wholly disappear
with the abolition of classes and their opposing interests." The
conditions that have made for the development of law in social relations are created by capitalism.2
In the Constitution, liberty and property are coupled in one
guarantee, the guarantee of due process of law; and behind that
guarantee is law-the Constitution as the supreme law of the land.
The Marxian doctrine which rejects law rejects it because it secures
liberty and property, neither of which belong in the communist
polity. The rejection of liberty by the exponents of administrative
absolutism is avowed. The rejection of property goes with it in
'IMARX, CRITIQUE OP THE GOTHA PROGRAM (Engl. transl. 1933) 31.
STucKA, STATE AND LAw ENcYcLoPEIA 1593 (in Russian, not trans-

2

lated); PASiruAmIS, ALLGEMEINE RECHTSLEHRE UN]) MARxIsMus (trans].
from Russian, 1929) introd. and c. 4. See Gsovsld, The Soviet Concept of Law
(1939) 7 FoRDlrA? L. Rnv. 1.
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effect, whether avowed or not. In the words of a German publicist,
an exponent of extreme ideas of authority (words adopted by a Russian exponent of the communist polity as it stood before the recent
shift toward the right) in the ideal state there is to be no law and
but one rule of law, namely, that there are no laws but only administrative ordinances and orders.At bottom, then, administrative absolutism involves taking
away the legal security of liberty and property. But while it is
taking its time to reach the goal toward which it moves, certain
other implications or presuppositions require consideration. One
upon which its adherents lay much stress is the assumption of adininistrative expertness. The business man, the industrialist, the
judge are all blunderers. They are to be subjected to enlightened
guidance of an expert, either a board or bureau of experts or an
expert employed by a board or bureau. Thus the conduct of enterprises will conform to an enlightened public interest as revealed to
the expert by the nature of his office. For it is to be noted that
the expertness is a purely ex officio expertness. The administrative
official or agent is not appointed because he is an expert. He is
an expert because he has been appointed to be one. We are told
continually that we must look at the problems of administration
realistically and that the failure of courts to take a realistic view
is the justification of putting administrative determinations beyond the reach of judicial review. But if we look at the realities
of administration and adjudication, there is not, there has never
been, there is not likely to be any such uniform guarantee of the
training of administrative officials and their agents and subordinates for their tasks as there is in the case of judges taken from the
bar. 4 At the battle of Balaclava, Lord Cardigan held that he was
qualified to command a brigade of cavalry in battle because, although he had only a barrack yard experience, he held, in the days
when commissions were purchasable, the Queen's commission as a
general. The famous charge of the Light Brigade was not the only
mistake of an ex officio expert on that occasion.
aPAsHUKxAIs, ubi supra, c. 2; PASHUXAmIS, THE SOVIET STATE AND

THE

REVOLUTION OF LAW (1931)

132; JELLNEK, GEsLz usN VERoDNUNG (1887)
234-235; Dobrin, Soviet Jurisprudenceand Socialism (1936) 52 L. Q. REV. 402.
For some examples of those chosen to do expert administrative work, see

NATIO1NAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
THE ENFORCEMENT OP THE PROHIBITION LAWS oF THE UNITED STATES 79;
YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY (1937) e. 22;

GLUECK, PROBATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1933)

71-73.

See also Tri-State

Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Com'n, 68 App. D. C. 294, 297,
96 F. (2d) 564 (1938).
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Again, administrative absolutism presupposes that administrative boards and commissions and agencies can be trusted to determine rights without the checks which obtain in the judicial process.
It presupposes that fair, objective, reasoned administrative determinations are assured by the administrative hunch or expertness,
without any of the checks which operate to assure fairness and objectivity and reason in judicial decision. It is assumed that the
courts, with all the checks of law, of training of the judges, of
public records of what is done, of review of the action of the single
judge by a bench of judges, and of professional and academic scrutiny and criticism of what they do, cannot be expected to and are
inherently unable to reach objective results. For a leading exponent of administrative absolutism, who now holds a high administrative office, with jus vitae necisque over private enterprise, is likewise in the science of law an exponent of a doctrine of psychological
determinism. He has urged, in effect, that the items of the judicial
process are shaped decisively by the psychological determinants of
the individual judge. These determinants are largely undiscoverable and hence judicial action is only in appearance and in pretence
uniform and predictable.' Such a theory of law in the hands of
an official empowered to apply law of his own making in his own
way speaks for itself. But it is another presupposition of administrative absolutism that a reasonable adjustment of relations and
regulation of conduct may be attained by putting the guiding and
regulating agency in the position of a party to controversial situations, like the man who intervenes in a brawl, not to stop the fight
but to go in and take part in it on the side of one of the combatants. Many examples might be cited.'
When lawyers show themselves skeptical as to the possibilities
of administrative absolutism under our polity, they are commonly
told that they are seeking to exclude all discretion from the process of determining rights and adjusting relations and regulating
conduct, and are seeking return to an old idea of governing all
things by rigid rules, mechanically applied, which was given up
long ago. But everything depends upon what is meant by "discretion." The lawyer thinks of a discretion held by law to the
LAW AND THE MODERN MND (1930) 111, 149; Frank, Are Judges
5FRAN,
Human? (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 17, 233. See PAsHUKANS, ubi szpra,
62; Dobrin, ubi supra, 415.
6 One need not make invidious specifications. Legislation or proposed legislation enabling or requiring administrative bureaus or boards or commissions
to intervene as parties is common enough.
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limits of the rule which commits some judicial action to the judge's
personal sense of what is right. He thinks of what he calls a
judicial, as distinguished from a personal discretion-a discretion
governed by principles.7 He thinks of a discretion subject to be
reviewed in case of abuse, and so held in check by knowledge that
if a genuine judgment is not exercised in a reasonable way the
action under the guise of discretion will be set aside.
Let me be understood. I am not attacking administration. I
am seeking to understand the implications and presuppositions of
the administrative absolutism toward which so much of recent legislation is tending. Administration must play a large part in any
polity under the social and economic conditions of today. It would
be idle to argue for any such restrictions of the administrative process as prevailed with us in the last half of the nineteenth century.
The demands of an expanding law of public utilities, the requirements of modern social legislation, which called for speedy and sure
enforcement and especially for inspection and supervision, and the
need of guidance of enterprise before and at the crisis of choice of
paths or devices, instead of requiring a guess as to the legally permissible course and judging of the correctness of the guess after
the event-all these things brought about a rapid and in some connections extreme development of administrative agencies. They
helped to produce the chaotic condition of boards and tribunals and
agencies with different powers, subject to different modes of review, relieved of review in varying degree; some with almost
judicial traditions, at the other extreme some -ith no traditions and growing disinclination to hear both sides if possible to
avoid it; some with powers of legislation, administration, and adjudication so far as it is possible to confer them and get by the
courts; some with power and practice of acting as an investigating
and accusing body, of advocacy at the hearings before themselves,
with adjudication upon their own accusations, and of executing
their own decrees-in short, the welter from which many scholars,
under the influence of ideas imported from Europe, seek escape
through administrative absolutism. But no such drastic departure
from our constitutional institutions is needed to bring about what
I"Because the matter is left in the discretion of the Court, it does not mean
that the Court is free to do exactly what it chooses, to indulge in sympathies
or to invent some new equitable doctrine between the parties. It means that
discretion is to be exercised upon judicial grounds in accordance with the
principles that have been recognized in this Court." Langton, J., in Greenwood v. Greenwood, [1937J Probate 157, 164.
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administrative agencies were needed to achieve. Our judicial organization was set up for pioneer communities in which little or
no administration was needed. Our legal procedure, inherited from
eighteenth-century England, and adapted to the rural, agricultural
America of our formative era, was not at once equal to the task
of applying our traditional doctrine of the supremacy of the law to
rapidly multiplying new administrative agencies. Not a little friction and waste resulted while administrative agencies were finding
themselves and the courts were struggling to apply constitutional
and legal limitations under an inadequate organization and procedure.
But, we shall be told, why not take a realistic view? These
administrative agencies are with us, they are busy at work on every
side. They have far more control over actual human relations and
actual conduct of enterprises than the courts. They are tending to
be the paramount agency of social control in our polity just as they
are emphatically the paramount agency in Continental Europe.
Why not acknowledge this and give up kicking against the pricks ?
To the lawyer the reasons for standing out against the tide of administrative absolutism are to be found not only in the presuppositions of the regime but in certain characteristics which, as he
reads the reports of cases in which courts in every part of the
English-speaking world have been called on to review administrative action, seem to be universal.
One of these characteristics is a bureaucratic disregard of the
maxim "hear the other side." Even when the statute setting up
an administrative agency expressly requires a hearing it has happened frequently that the bureau or commission has acted without
any hearing of interested parties and without any real findings of
fact.8 This tendency has appeared in England and in Australia as
well as with us. 9 Again, there has been both with us and in England
a marked tendency to decide on the basis of matters not before the
administrative tribunal; to act on evidence not produced, or on
"Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 82 L. Ed. 1129 (1938) ;
Saxton Coal Min. Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Com'n, 68 App. D. C. 245,
96 F. (2d) 517 (1938) ; United States v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co., 294 U.
S. 499, 510, 55 S. Ct. 462, 79 L. Ed. 1023 (1935); Tri-State Broadcasting Co.
v. Federal Communications Com'n, 68 App. D. C. 292, 294, 96 F. (2d) 564
(1938); Saginaw BroEdcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Com'n, 68 App.
D. C. 282, 287-289, 96 F. (2d) 554 (1938).
0Errington v. Minister of Health, [1935] 1 K. B. 249, 280-281; Rex v.
Housing Appeal Tribunal, [1920] 3 K. B. 334, 342, 344; Cooper v. Wilson,
[1937] 2 K. B. 309, 345; In re Evans, 52 NEw SOUTH WALES WEEXLY NOTES 1.
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secret reports of inspectors or examiners with no guarantee of a
complete or impartial inspection or examination." There has even
been a tendency to act on second-hand statements of general repute,
opinion and gossip, sometimes traceable to preparation in advance
by one of the parties, without opportunity to the party adversely
affected to cross examine the sources of opinion.. This sort of thing
is especially manifest in connection with a tendency to make determinations on the basis of pre-formed opinions and prejudices. A
bureau easily comes to consider the administrative determining function one of acting rather than of deciding. 2 It easily comes to
apply to the determining function the methods of the directing
function. Administrative agencies are peculiarly subject to political
pressure and thus tend to do what "will get by" at the expense of
the law. Where they have rulemaking powers, they operate under
none of the checks that obtain in the case of legislative lawmaking.
There is as like as not no notice to the affected parties till the rule
is made. When there is a hearing it is not unlikely to be merely
to comply in form with statutory requirements, the rule having
been prepared before the hearing instead of growing out of it. It
has even happened that a suit involving an administrative rule has
izone to the highest court of the land before it was discovered that
the rule had no existence. 13 Moreover, administrative rulemaking,
as was brought out more than once under administrative enforcement of the National Prohibition Act, has a tendency to the making
of arbitrary rules for bureau convenience at the expense of important interests. 4
But what most troubles the lawyer is the union of rulemaking,
investigation, advocacy, and adjudication in one bureau and not
infrequently in practice in one person. 5 This is supposed to be
required for efficiency. There was much experience of this under
prohibition. The zeal to get results at whatever cost was not the
least of the features of that regime that brought the administration
1

Interstate Commerce Com'n v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93,
33 S. Ct. 185, 57 L. Ed. 431 (1912).
u Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Com n, 68 App. D.
C. 292, 294-295, 96 F. (2d) 564 (1938).
22 See Allen, Some Aspects of Administrative Law (1929)
J. Soc. PUBLIC
TEACHERS OF LAW 10, 16.
1 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 412, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed.
446 (1935).
4E. g., Doran v. Eisenberg, 30 F. (2d) 503, 504 (C. 0. A. 3d, 1929).
11See Vanderbilt, The Bar and the Public (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 871, 873.
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of the law into disrepute and disfavor. 6 The same phenomenon
may be seen in the parole boards in more than one jurisdiction. The
inability of those interested to find out what the rules are or what
rules are the basis of action, the large powers confided to the boards
and the arbitrary exercise of them have brought on violent prison
outbreaks more than once and in more than one jurisdiction.
Another feature of administrative absolutism which troubles
the lawyer is the exercise of jurisdiction by deputies. Administrative determination of appeals from the action of administrative
subordinates is frequently a one man review, it may even be a
review by a secretary of the official with reviewing jurisdiction, or
a rubber stamp review of the action of subordinates by those subordinates themselves. Judicial review is review by a bench of
judges and there is no such thing as a judge exercising his reviewing authority in any other way than in person. 7
I have spoken of administrative determinations. But when we
turn to administrative guidance, the primary function of administration, we find phenomena which are equally disturbing. One is a
tendency to force theories upon those subject to administrative
regulation. Those who for the time being shape the policies of administrative bureaus compel indirectly by denial of the facilities
of the mails or of interstate commerce a molding of the conduct of
enterprises or of business to the patterns fashionable for the moment
with the "experts" of the bureau-often doctrinaire theories with
no experience behind them. In the same way legislation may impose punitive taxation to enforce a theory upon enterprise where
acceptance of it would not be compelled directly. How far this may
go is illustrated by the proposal to license all corporations that can
be reached under the powers of the federal government. That this
would subject every corporation of much consequence to regulation
by a national as well as a state master is obvious. That much regulation is indicated for many situations in corporate management is
clear enough. But subjection of corporate business to bureau control, under the conditions of today means subjection substantially of
all business to such control, since all businesses of much significance
transcend state lines. To commit the whole business of the country
to the control of a bureau at Washington, in view of the tendency
10
8
NATIONxp COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT
ON THE ]ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 81-82.
1T
This is true in Roman law [DIG. i, 21, 5; DIG. ii, 1, 5; COD. iii, 1, 5], and
in the canon law [DEcnETUM, 1, 29, 3; TELLEE, COmmENTARIA (1715 ed.) I,
614] as well as in modern law.
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of administrative bureaus to disregard jurisdictional limits,"' to
seek to extend continually the sphere of their action, and to push
19
their regulatory powers to the limit, is something that should
give us pause. Is there anything in experience of bureaucratic
management to indicate that it will prove better than a legally controlled private management? But in a widely held current view
as to legislation and administration, experience in our past is an
irrelevant consideration.
What needs to be thought of in connection with bureau control
of all business and legislative indirect control by punitive taxation
is the implication that there is need of remodeling the social order
at once and that it is the task of the federal government to carry
out this remodeling. If we are sure of this the question still remains
whether the details of the task are wisely committed to subordinates
in administrative bureaus instead of being formulated directly by
legislative lawmaking. For as the legislative setting up of administrative agencies goes on, there is want of any consistent system of
regulation. Indeed, the tendency to administrative absolutism leads
to such want of system. From that standpoint there is no objection
to requiring practices of private business to which government business competition is not subjected. When regulation is simply the
application of arbitrary will, without the check of constitutional or
legal limitations judicially enforced, the government may demand
that business recognize and adhere to what are pronounced fair
business practices while it violates them all as it may choose. It
may insist, for example, upon a theory of "full disclosure" as
applied to private business operations and yet adopt practices in
contravention of that theory. It may compete with private business
without being subject to legal rules or standards of fair competition.
That the presupposition of all this is that private business is something which is to disappear in the administrative remodeling of the
social order does not disturb the advocate of administrative absolutism. But are the American people prepared to admit that presupposition? Much could be overlooked in the necessarily crude
beginnings of administration in a land where it had been unknown
on any large scale. But administrative regulation is now old
enough in the United States to know what it is doing and why it
is doing it.
The bMte noire of the proponents of administrative absolutism
v. Eisenberg, 30 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).
ig This is admittted by a leading advocate of unchecked administrative action.
Jennings, Courts and Arainistrative Law (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 429, 454.
18 Doran
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is judicial review enforcing the constitutional guarantee of due
process of law. There is constant pressure by administrative
bureaus upon legislative bodies to tie down review so as to make it
practically ineffective or to do away with it altogether. As the
latter course is not constitutionally admissible, the plan of the moment is to evade the Constitution by making an apparent concession
to it in setting up an administrative appellate tribunal permitting
administration to review itself. The purposes of administrative
bureaus are too high for judicial consideration according to the
narrow standards of the law. The methods of carrying out those
purposes must be determined by the purposes themselves and not
tied down by such legalistic ideas as hearing both sides, acting upon
evidence, or basing determinations on definite findings of fact.
Without effective provisions for a record as the basis of review the
review by an administrative appellate court cannot achieve the
purposes of review as a check upon administrative action. If the
tribunal is to be a real court, it will be no more acceptable to the
advocates of administrative absolutism than the ordinary courts,
and it will merely multiply courts in a time of judicial organization
calling for unification and simplification rather than for adding
new tribunals. If it is not to be a real court, the whole purpose of
review of administrative action is given up.
It is not mere toryism to protest against institutional waste.
It is as reprehensible as any form of irreparable waste. To look
only at our own country the deprofessionalizing of the professions.
on the basis of doctrinaire false democracy, which went on at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, was a bit of needless waste
which we only began to repair after a hundred years, but which has
bad results in the administration of justice today in every large
city in the land. The complete decentralization of banking under
Andrew Jackson was another bit of waste, which has given us banking crises at regular intervals, while in the rest of the world the
banks stand firm under economic depressions. After one hundred
years this waste is far from repaired. Schemes for remaking the
social order whether consciously planned or unconsciously involved
in the drift of administrative absolutism and bureau dictatorship,
are likely to do no more than bring about like institutional waste.
Economic institutions are not the least important of the institutions
of civilized society.
It is a common device of the adherents and proponents of administrative absolutism to set up a straw man, label it with the name
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of those who question their doctrine, and proceed vigorously to
belabor that straw man. If one challenges administrative justice,
administrative lawmaking, administrative investigation, administrative advocacy before itself, and administrative dictation of its
theories for the moment, concentrated in one bureau or one man,
he is a reactionary. He does not believe in any regulation of the
conduct of enterprises. He seeks to return to the regime of laissez
faire. He would hamper administration by subjecting it to the
legal and judicial straight jacket which was imposed on it fifty years
ago. A modern, simple, speedy, inexpensive mode of judicial review
of administrative determination and rulemaking, along lines now
well understood in the reform of legal procedure which has gone
on steadily for the past thirty years, 20 would preserve the substance
of the guarantees of the Constitution, and leave administration free
to do its real work within constitutional limits. There is nothing
reactionary in such a proposition. It is in the line of progress of
our administrative law upon American principles.
The implication, the presupposition of administrative absolutism is that of every form of autocracy. Indeed, administrative
bureaus and officials rather than courts have been the agents of
government by autocrats wherever there has been personal as contrasted with constitutional government. The Roman emperor was
set up as a god. Who could preseume to match his wisdom against
that of a god? The autocratic king of the seventeenth and eighteenth century centralized monarchies ruled by divine right. What
were individual rights against right derived from God? The administrative bureau rules by right of postulated onnicompetence.
It presupposes a lack of competence on the part of the rest of the
community to manage their own affairs, or else that there is no such
thing as their own affairs. What is individual experience or intelligence or resource to match against the omnicompetence of an administrative bureau (and the delegated omnicompetence of one of
its clerks or inspectors or investigators) chartered to do what it
likes in each case looked upon as unique? To complete the regime
there is needed only a Duce or Fiihrer or superman head administrator to direct all of these sub-supermen in a common path. The
corollary of the proposition that men are not competent to manage
the details of their private affairs is that they are not competent to
manage public affairs. In the end administrative absolutism must
stand upon a political absolutism.
g., the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure in Criminal Cases, 292
q.
U. S. 660, rules III, IV, VII, VIII, IX, X.
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